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Abstract
The grounding process relies on the evi-
dence that speakers give about their un-
derstanding (Clark and Schaefer, 1989).
However in existing formal models of
grounding (Cahn, 1992; Cahn and Bren-
nan, 1999; Traum, 1999) evidence of un-
derstanding is assumed to besymmetri-
cally and synchronouslyshared by the
speakers. We propose a formal model,
based on (Cahn, 1992), that removes these
simplifications; we do so by distinguishing
the phase of interpretation from the phase
of evidence extraction and introducing the
notion of floating contributions.
1 Introduction
A dialogue is a process that presupposes the col-
laboration of both participants. Each speaker in
turn assumes that the other will show evidence of
understanding or misunderstanding of her utter-
ance, and evidence indicating its relevance to the
previous utterance. This mutual assumption is the
basis of thegrounding process(Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Clark and Schaefer, 1989), the pro-
cess by which speakers try to reach mutual un-
derstanding. Successful grounding does not guar-
antee mutual understanding though: it can hap-
pen that the grounding evidence leads two speak-
ers to believe that they have achieved perfect un-
derstanding, whereas in reality they have under-
stood two completely different things (Cherubini
and van der Pol, 2005). But although this shows
that successful grounding is not asufficientcon-
dition for achieving mutual understanding, it does
seem to be anecessaryone.
Different models of the grounding process de-
fine when (and, sometimes, how) an utterance is
added to the common ground (a representation of
what is believed to have been mutually accepted).
In the Contribution Model(Clark and Schaefer,
1989) the grounding process results in a recur-
sively structured directed acyclic graph represen-
tation of the dialogue grounding structure, the ba-
sic unit of which is thecontribution. Contribu-
tions are twofold units consisting of: (1) an ut-
terance called thepresentation(or Pr) and (2) an
acceptancelinked to a sequence of contributions
or a single utterance. The acceptance (orAc) con-
tains the negotiation of the understanding of the
presentation in order to reach thegrounding cri-
terion. The grounding criterion is a threshold de-
fined by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) to rep-
resent the level of understanding required by the
contributor; we shall use the expressionground-
ing statusto mean the current state of the believed
mutual understanding of an utterance. When the
grounding criterion holds for a contribution, that
is, when its status is grounded, both speakers con-
sider it closed and can choose whether or not to
integrate its semantic content as a mutual belief.
The grounding status is established via simple evi-
dence of understanding and relevance. The Contri-
bution Model was the pioneering approach to the
modeling of grounding and its insights influenced
the subsequent development of formal models in-
tended for computational applications.
Probably the best known of these subsequent
models is theGrounding Acts Model(Traum and
Allen, 1992; Traum, 1994; Traum, 1999). This
model is based on the notion ofgrounding acts,
low level communicative acts whose goal is to
ground content at the utterance level. The basic
unit of analysis provided by the Grounding Acts
Model is a non-recursive sequence of utterances
called aDiscourse Unit(DU). The grounding pro-
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cess is modelled by an update of the state of a
Discourse Unit by a grounding act; this makes the
approach particularly suitable for integration into
information-state based models of dialogue (such
as Matheson et al. (2000)); transitions between
states are modelled in (Traum and Allen, 1992)
and many subsequent papers using finite state au-
tomata triggered by the various grounding acts.
For example, aRequestRepairact by participant
A would send a Discourse Unit into a state where
a Repair by participant B and a subsequentAc-
knowledgeby A would be needed to ground it.
The Grounding Acts Model makes the assump-
tion that the grounding level can be distinguished
from the intentional level. However, as was noted
by (Stirling et al., 2000), it is often not easy to
delineate DUs, which makes it difficult to clearly
distinguish the grounding level from deeper lev-
els of understanding that emerge via complex ex-
changes. Hence, as our primary motivation is to
explore ways of uniformly integrating grounding
at the utterance level with complex negotiations of
understanding, we have not taken the Grounding
Acts Model as our point of departure.
Instead we have chosen to develop theEx-
change Modelapproach presented in (Cahn, 1992;
Cahn and Brennan, 1999), which are more directly
based on the original Contribution Model. The
central innovation provided by Exchange Models
is a level ofexchangethat is higher than the level
of contributions (this central notion is very much
in the spirit of the implicit adjacency pairs used
in Clark and Schaefer (1989)). Like work based
on the Grounding Acts Model, these Exchange
Models have a formal definition and provide on-
line models of grounding. What makes them par-
ticularly useful for our purposes, however, is that
they follow the Contribution Model in producing
graph-like representations of the dialogue ground-
ing structure; in our view, this makes them par-
ticularly well-suited for modeling more complex
negotiations of understanding.
Nonetheless, different as these three types of
model are, they share a common deficiency:they
cannot deal with wrongly recognized or unrecog-
nized grounding acts or evidence of understand-
ing. In the original Exchange Models, the evi-
dence is always assumed to besymmetricandsyn-
chronous—that is correctly and immediatelyun-
derstood by the hearer. In the Grounding Acts
Model, matters are a little more subtle. There an
unrecognized grounding act would initiate a new
Discourse Unit, and hence the model might be said
to handle asymmetric grounding. Nonetheless, it
is not obvious how, once grounded, this Discourse
Unit should be reintegrated, nor how the effects
of the newly understood grounding act could be
taken into account with respect to previous Dis-
course Units. It may be the case that the Ground-
ing Acts Model and related information states ap-
proaches (such as Matheson et al. (2000; Larsson
and Traum (2000)) could be extended to handle
this kind of reintegration, perhaps by providing
additional update rules. But we have found that
the (recursive) graph-like representations used by
Exchange Models provides a particularly perspic-
uous setting for a preliminary explorations of the
issues involved.
Accordingly, we shall proceed as follows. In
Section 2 we discuss existing Exchange Models
and their shortcomings in more detail. In Sec-
tion 3, we present an augmented Exchange Model,
inspired by (Cahn, 1992), which repairs these defi-
ciencies. In Section 4, with the help of an example,
we show in detail how the model works. Section 5
concludes.
2 A closer look at Exchange Models
The Exchange Models proposed in (Cahn, 1992;
Cahn and Brennan, 1999) are intended to formal-
ize the Contribution Model to enable it to be em-
bedded in dialogue systems. Like the Contribu-
tion Model, they are based on (recursive) graph-
like structures, but they add a level ofexchange
above the Contribution/Presentation/Acceptance
levels present in the Contribution Model. An ex-
change is a pair of contributions defined relative
to a task: the first contribution proposes a task
while the second contribution executes the task.
The grounding process itself is modeled by a de-
cision table based on two features: (1) the evi-
dence of understanding manifested in an utterance
and (2) the role of the current utterance in an ex-
change (i.e. in a dialogue task). In these mod-
els, the grounded dialogue structure is represented
from each speakers’ individual point of view, and
“all contribution graphs are private models, and
can represent the perspective of only one agent”
(Cahn and Brennan, 1999).
The model defined in (Cahn, 1992) (henceforth
EM92) uses three categories of evidence: UN-
DERSTOODRELEVANT, NOTUNDERSTOOD and
34
u1: Where does Dan work ?
s2: In the natural language group
u3: No, I meant his office
Figure 1: UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT evi-
dence example (dialogue 6.3.3)
UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT. However it con-
siders the integration of the utterances of the
speaker based on the evidence sheint nded to
produce, and does not take into accounthow the
hearer actually interprets this evidence. This
model can thus only render the perspective of the
speaker. The model defined in (Cahn and Brennan,
1999) (henceforthEM99) is limited to the system’s
point of view, unlikeEM92 which is participant-
agnostic. It is based on two categories of evidence:
ACCEPTABLEand NOTACCEPTABLE for the user.
This is not enough to cover all cases; for exam-
ple, it is not possible for the system to warn that
its utterance was misunderstood (though the user
can do this). The main improvement ofEM99
overEM92 is that it characterizes grounding from
the hearer’s point of view (in this case the system)
and integrates the utterances of the user as well as
those of the system.
So what is wrong with these models? An ex-
ample should make matters clear. Consider Fig-
ure 1, which shows an example dialogue from
(Cahn, 1992). When S utterss2, she believes her
utterance is a relevant answer tou1. That is, she
appendss2 as the second contribution of the ex-
change initiated byu1 (see Figure 2).1
Figure 2: Dialogue 6.3.3 afters2
When S receivesu3 and extracts the UNDER-
STOODNOTRELEVANT evidence it conveys, she
has to restructure her view of the dialogue to take
into account the fact thats2 is not relevant with
respect tou1. That is, she must moves2 into a
new exchange in the acceptance phase ofu1 and
appendu3 as the second contribution of this ex-
change (see Figure 3).
1In the paper we sometimes use the term utterance instead
of contribution, or an utterance symbol to denote a contri-
bution; in these case we always mean “the contribution pre-
sented by this utterance”.
Figure 3: Dialogue 6.3.3 afteru3
But now take the point of view of U on the sit-
uation: she interprets2 as not relevant with re-
spect tou1 as soon as she receives it, and thus
doesnot have to revise her model. Instead she in-
tegratess2 directly into the acceptance phase of
her own utteranceu1. To properly model such sit-
uations from both points of view, we need to con-
sider not merely the intended evidence of under-
standing, but also the actual interpretation of evi-
dence.
HoweverEM92cannot handle this behavior be-
cause it does not consider the interpretation of the
hearer: it is focused on how integrate an utter-
ance according to the evidence of understanding
the speaker intended it to convey, and not on how
the hearer actually interpreted the utterance. The
model EM99, on the other hand, partially takes
into account the hearer’s interpretation in one case,
namely when the user gives ACCEPTABLE evi-
dence and does not propose a task. For example,
consider the exchange shown in Figure 4.EM99
handles such examples well. If the system believes
it does not understandu2, its next utterance would
initiate a new exchange in the acceptance phase
of u2. On the other hand, if it believes it under-
standsu2, its next utterance would initiate a new
exchange at the dialogue level.
s1: Where’s Dan ?
u2: In his office (+ noise)
Figure 4: ACCEPTABLE evidence example
This is a step in the right direction, but it does
not go far enough: the interpretation of the hearer
needs to be taken into account inall cases, for
bothspeakers,whateverthe evidence conveyed by
the interpreted utterance. Only if the hearer un-
derstands can she extract the evidence of under-
standing. If the interpretation of the hearer is not
taken into account, it is impossible to consider
the non-understanding (or the misunderstanding)
of the evidence of understanding. As a conse-
quence, models that make this simplification can
only deal with symmetricand synchronousevi-
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u1: Where’s Dan ?
s2: Dan Smith or Dan Jones ? (+ noise)
u3: Uh, what did you say ?
Figure 5: Not understanding a NOTUNDERSTOOD
evidence of understanding
dence of understanding. Symmetric means that the
presented evidence of understanding is always un-
derstood by the hearer as expected by the speaker.
Synchronous means that it is also understood as
soon as the utterance is emitted. NeitherEM92
nor EM99can handle the fact that theacceptance
functionof an utterance is not always played at the
same moment for the two speakers. In the exam-
ple in Figure 5, the user does not know that the ut-
terances2 manifests NOTUNDERSTOODevidence
because she herself has not understoods2 suffi-
ciently to extract the evidence of understanding.
3 An extended Exchange Model
The aim of our work is to specify a grounding
model that handles asymmetric and asynchronous
evidence of understanding. We do so in a way that
retains the advantages of bothEM92 and EM99,
and follow these models in using a small collec-
tion of sharp understanding categories. We found
EM92, which does not distinguish the user from
the system and has better categories of understand-
ing, to be a better starting point, and thus have re-
worked the key insights ofEM99 in the setting of
EM92. We introduce asymmetry and asynchronic-
ity into this model by distinguishing two steps in
the interpretative process: the understanding of an
utterance, and the extraction of the evidence of un-
derstanding it conveys. Our model is defined from
the point of view of the hearer (who we will refer
to by self). It considers how self understands an
utterancebeforetaking into account the evidence
of understanding it shows. If the utterance is UN-
DERSTOODRELEVANT, the evidence it shows is
extracted and is integrated as inEM99. If the ut-
terance is UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT, it is in-
tegrated as initiating a new exchange under the ac-
ceptance phase of the previous contribution with-
out considering the evidence of understanding it
shows. If the utterance is NOTUNDERSTOOD, the
contribution is introduced asfloating, waiting for
later integration in the graph.2 Its integration into
2In this version, NOTUNDERSTOODmeans that the evi-
dence is not understood either. Multiple degrees of under-
the main dialogue structure is possible only when
its acceptance phase shows what the evidence of
understanding was. Then the utterance has to be
reinterpreted, taking into account the newly un-
derstood evidence. However the grounding status
of floating items could remain pending and never
be solved, for example if the acceptance phase is
abandoned.
Do floating contributions have an analog in the
Grounding Acts Model? We don’t believe so. One
could try comparing the collection of ungrounded
states of a Discourse Unit to the acceptance phase
of a contribution. That is, the open state of the ac-
ceptance phase of a contribution in an Exchange
Model could be regarded as the analog of the un-
grounded states of a Discourse Unit in the Ground-
ing Acts Model. But the notion of a floating con-
tribution is stronger than the notion of ungrounded
states: when a contribution is floating, it means not
only that it is not grounded yet, but also that the
evidence it manifests is not known either. Further-
more, floating status isn’t correctly captured by
the ungroundable state used in the Grounding Acts
Model either. The ungroundable state is a termi-
nal state, reached by canceling the grounding pro-
cess. However the floating status that some contri-
butions acquire in our approach is intended to be
temporary—if the evidence conveyed by the con-
tribution comes to be understood, its floating sta-
tus is cancelled and the contribution is integrated
into the main dialogue structure.
So: how can we augment the Exchange Model
to handle asymmetric and asynchronous evidence
of understanding? The main additions we shall
make are the following. First, in order to keep
track of the floating contributions, we have to
maintain another structure which contains the se-
quence of pending contributions. Second, we
have to handle reinterpretation and specify how
the newly acquired evidence of understanding is
used to integrate a floating contribution. Third,
an utterance can now give evidence of understand-
ing concerning many previous utterances, because
an utterance which closes an acceptance phase and
gives evidence as such can now reveal how to in-
terpret the accepted contribution too.
A formalization3 is presented in Table 1 and Ta-
standing are possible though (Brennan and Hulteen, 1995).
3The tables are simplifi ed. We do not discuss here di-
alogue beginning and ending nor the necessity of having a
three-fold context〈Si, Oj , Sk〉 to manage reinterpretation.
The actual implementation also deals with evaluation utter-
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Self interpretation ofOi Integration ofOi Integration ofSi+1
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT
w/r Si−1
integrateOi according to the evidences
of understanding it shows:
if Oi shows evidences about another
utteranceSj , call Table 2 withSj else
call it with Si−1
integrateSi+1 afterOi
UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT
w/r Si−1
integrateOi as initiating a new exchange
in the acceptance phase ofSi−1
integrateSi+1 afterOi
NOTUNDERSTOOD Oi presents a floating contribution,
waiting to be understood to be integrated
integrateSi+1 as initiating a new
exchange in the acceptance phase ofOi
Table 1: Integration of both utterances (Oi, Si+1)
ble 2. It covers the aforementioned cases with
delays in the integration of utterances. We use
the following notation:Oi stands for the utterance
produced by theother speaker (O) at timei, and
Si+1 stands for the utterance produced byself (S)
at time i + 1. An utterance is said to initiate an
exchange if it is the presentation of the first contri-
bution of this exchange. An exchange is said to be
open if its first contribution is set while its second
contribution is not. The main dialogue structure
is calledD and the floating structureF . Finally,
“integrateui afteruj” is a shorthand for:
• if uj initiated an exchange, appendui as the
second contribution of this exchange;
• else appendui as the second contribution
of the closest upper level open exchange, if
there is one;
• else (all exchanges are closed),ui initiates a
new exchange at the dialogue level.
• in all casesui closes the acceptance phase of
uj.
Reinterpretation of an utterance consists of call-
ing the algorithm again with a new interpretation
and new evidence of understanding. The only dif-
ference is that the contribution presented by this
utterance does not have to be created because it
already exists in the floating structure. If the ut-
terance is eventually understood (relevant or not)
it can be moved in the dialogue structure in accor-
dance with its new interpetation, and the new ev-
idence of understanding it shows. This evidence
of understanding is consequently acquired asyn-
chronously by the two participants.
The main simplifying assumptions made by our
algorithm are the following:
ances and abandons. For a complete description, please refer
to http://www.loria.fr/˜denis
• We suppose a direct correlation between the
result of an interpretation ofOi and the ev-
idence of understanding conveyed bySi+1.
How S interpretsOi is manifested in the ut-
terance she produces in turnSi+1. That is, if
an utterance is not understood or not relevant,
one has to clarify the situation. This simplifi-
cation is based on the collaborative dialogue
hypothesis.
• In the version of the algorithm presented
above, the evidence of understanding is ei-
ther understood or not. That is, the asym-
metry is binary and there cannot be any mis-
understanding of the evidence of understand-
ing. Such misunderstandings would be more
complex to handle because of the increased
divergence between the participants dialogue
representation structures. But systems can be
mistaken when extracting the evidence of un-
derstanding, and we think it will be necessary
for dialogue systems to represent this.
• Contributions always alternate. The present
algorithm does not actually manage several
contributions in one speech turn because this
would mean taking into accountinterleaved
evidence of understanding. But, once again,
we feel that this extension will be necessary
to handle more realistic dialogues.
A tool illustrating our model has been imple-
mented in Java. This takes as input a dialogue
where each utterance is annotated by the evidence
of understanding its speaker believes it to convey.
The resulting output is the dialogue structure and
the floating structure for both speakers at different
steps. The tool was used to generate the diagrams
used in this paper, and in particular, the diagrams
in the example to which we now turn.
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Evidence of understanding ofSj
showed inOi
Sj did not initiate an exchange or initiated an
exchange at the dialogue level
Sj initiated an exchange in an
acceptance phase
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT
w/r Oj−1
integrateOi afterSj integrateOi afterSj ,
if the accepted contribution is
floating, reinterpret its
presentationOk: call Table 1
whereOi = Ok
UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT
w/r Oj−1
move theSj contribution as the fi rst contribution of a new exchange in the accep-
tance phase ofOj−1,
integrateOi afterSj
NOTUNDERSTOOD integrateOi as initiating a new exchange in the acceptance phase ofSj
Table 2: Integration ofOi when it is understood and thought relevant
Utterance and evidence of understanding it shows Point of view of A Point of view of B
a1: Where does Dan work ?
b2: In the natural language group
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT(a1)
a3: What did you say ?
NOTUNDERSTOOD(b2)
b4: I said: in the natural language group
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT(a3)
a5: No, I meant his offi ce
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT(b4)
UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT(b2)
b6: Near post H33
UNDERSTOODRELEVANT(a5)
Table 3: Detailed example
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4 Detailed example
The example in Table 3 is a modification of the
example 6.3.3 in (Cahn, 1992), in which the sec-
ond utterance is not understood by the user (called
A whereas the other participant, the system, is
calledB). This dialogue illustrates the asymmetry
and asynchronicity of the learning of the evidence
of understanding showed byb2. The left column
presents the utterances and the evidence of un-
derstanding showed by them from their speaker’s
point of view. The two other columns present the
dialogue structure according to each point of view.
The first utterancea1 is believed UNDER-
STOODRELEVANT4 by B and is integrated nor-
mally as initiating an exchange at the dialogue
level. The dialogue viewed byA is the same.
The second utteranceb2 shows a divergence.B
believes thatb2 presents an UNDERSTOODREL-
EVANT evidence of understanding and thus inte-
grates it as the second contribution of the first ex-
change. However this evidence is not shared by
A, who does not understandb2 and therefore can-
not integrate it. She just keeps the contribution
floating, awaiting to be integrated when it is suffi-
ciently understood (seeFa in Table 3).
Utterancea3 shows thatb2 was NOTUNDER-
STOOD by A and that she requires clarification.
Becausea3 is understood byB, the evidence of
understanding it contains is used to integrate it as
the initiator of a new exchange under the accep-
tance phase ofb2 contribution.
Utteranceb4 shows thata3 was interpreted UN-
DERSTOODRELEVANT by B. Therefore it is in-
tegrated by both speakers as the second contribu-
tion of the clarification exchange. However there
is a new divergence when processing the utterance
b4. For B, b4 is only an answer to the clarifica-
tion request. But withb4, A can now interpretb2.
As b2 is now understood byA, she can extract the
evidence of understanding it showed, and act ac-
cording to her own interpretation. In this case, be-
causeb2 is UNDERSTOODNOTRELEVANT by A,
she won’t take into account the evidence of un-
derstanding showed byb2. The acquisition of the
evidence of understanding showed byb2 is asyn-
chronous but not taken into account; see Table 1.
The reinterpretation ofb2, according to the UN-
DERSTOODNOTRELEVANT rule, leads to theb2
contribution being embedded as initiating a new
4The fi rst utterance is assumed relevant when it is under-
stood
exchange under the acceptance phase ofa1.
The utterancea5 is crucial for reaching the
grounding criterion. It makes available two pieces
of evidence of understanding: first it shows that
b4 is an UNDERSTOODRELEVANT reply to a3
and second it shows thatb2 is UNDERSTOOD-
NOTRELEVANT with respect toa1. Its effect is
to revise theB view on the dialogue to create a
new exchange in the acceptance phase ofa1. Do-
ing this means that the structures of the grounding
model converge for both speakers; they now agree
on the current view of dialogue.
The utteranceb6 is the final answer to the
first question. It shows thata5 was UNDER-
STOODRELEVANT by B and UNDERSTOODREL-
EVANT by A. It is integrated as a relevant reply to
the first contribution of the upper level exchange.
5 Discussion and further work
This paper discusses the problems posed by asym-
metric and asynchronous evidence of understand-
ing, and gives a preliminary model of how such
evidence could be handled. It does so by dis-
tinguishing the phase of interpretation from the
phase of evidence extraction and introducing the
notion of floating contributions into the Exchange
Model. Such contributions cannot be immediately
attached to the dialogue structure because the ev-
idence of understanding they show is not known.
When these contributions are accepted, they have
to be reinterpreted in order to extract the evidence
of understanding they manifest.
A side effect of our model is that it provides a
novel solution to the recursive acceptance problem
defined in (Traum, 1994; Traum, 1999): if an ac-
ceptance utterance needs to be acceptedbeforeit
can play its acceptance function, then no contribu-
tion would ever be complete. To solve the prob-
lem, we make the assumption that a participant
may form the belief that she has understood (or
not) an utterance as soon as she receives it; she
doesnot have to subordinate her belief to further
acceptance (we believe that this assumption can be
motivated by the ideas on timing in joint actions
in Chapter 3 of (Clark, 1996)). The acceptance
function of an utterance can be played, from the
hearer’s point of view,as soon as she understands
the utterance. On the other hand, to check whether
what she said successfully played its intended ac-
ceptance role, the speaker of the utterance has to
wait for the hearer’s response. However,as soon
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as the hearer responds, the appropriate acceptance
function may be played. But when misunderstand-
ing occurs, the acceptance role of an utterance is
delayed up to the moment it is sufficiently under-
stood to be integrated into the common ground.
The implemented model we have presented still
suffers from a number of limitations; for exam-
ple it does not deal with misunderstanding of the
evidence of understanding. Planned future work
will cover these more complex divergences in dia-
logue structure in addition to multi-contributions,
that is, when several contributions by the same
speaker in the same turn. We hope that this model
and its implementation will be the first stage of a
larger enterprise: specifying the grounding status
of the contents of a contribution in terms of dia-
logue structure.
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